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Substantial Proportionality Not Required:
Achieving Title IX Compliance




itle IX of the Education Amendments of 19721 was originally
intended to prevent sex discrimination and promote equal
opportunity in educational programs and activities that receive
federal funding.2 Through the years, the focus of Title IX has shifted to
intercollegiate athletics, resulting in an incredible array of new opportuni-
ties for women.' Athletic expenses have increased as fast as the opportuni-
ties for women in intercollegiate athletics; however, as budgets tighten, the
ability of colleges to add athletic opportunities for men and women has
diminished. Thus, a conflict exists in today's world of intercollegiate sports
between income constraints and achieving complete equality of opportu-
nity. Title IX advocates are demanding strict compliance with the
components of Title IX, but developing new sports teams costs money that
athletic departments do not have.4 Instead of adding women's sports,
J.D. expected 2000, University of Kentucky.
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1995).
2 See David Aronberg, Crumbling Foundations: Why Recent Judicial and
Legislative Challenges to TitlelXMay Signallts Demise, 47 FLA. L. REV. 741,747
(1995). The author provides a comprehensive review of Title IX's legislative
history.
3 See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
4 See Deborah L. Rhode, Despite Title IX, Double Standard Still Persists,
NAT'L L.J., May 25, 1998, at A19; see also Denise K. Stellmach, Note, Title IX
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institutions are eliminating men's sports in an attempt to offer equal
opportunities for both sexes.'
The decision by many colleges and universities to eliminate men's
sports comes after consistent rulings against universities in Title IX
litigation.6 This litigation has both prevented universities from dropping
women's sports and forced the addition of women's squads in times of
economic crisis.7 Additionally, Title IX advocates have successfully fought
reverse discrimination suits that alleged Title IX was being incorrectly
enforced as an affirmative action statute.8
Judicial interpretation of Title IX requirements has resulted in the
nearly universal solution of meeting Title IX by dropping men's sports.'
Courts have focused on requiring equal proportions of male and female
athletes instead of focusing on whether a university has effectively met the
interests of the student body. 11 Title IX clearly was not intended to improve
only the proportion of athletes who are female by way of dropping men's
sports.
1'
In order for Title IX to succeed in the future, universities and courts
must find a way to increase the overall number of opportunities for women
and stop basing Title IX's success on a comparison of women's athletic
opportunities to men's athletic opportunities. Eliminating men's sports at
universities across the nation while women's sports remain at status quo
does not help either sex when overall participation drops. This result was
surely not the goal of Title IX's drafters.
The courts, however, are not entirely to blame for the current ineffec-
tiveness of Title IX. A look at the budgets of athletic departments across
the nation shows a systematic mismanagement of funds, resulting in many
schools lacking the revenue needed to create and fund new and existing
sports. 1 Institutions can move toward meeting the requirements of Title IX
The Mandatefor Equality in Collegiate Athletics, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 203, 208-12,
220-25 (1994).
5 See infra notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
6 See Aronberg, supra note 2, at 772 n.214 (discussing the major cases that
apply Title IX to athletics).
7 See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993).
8 See, e.g., Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994).
'See infra notes 112-21 and accompanying text.
" See generally Eugene G. Bemardo, II, Note and Comment, Unsportsmanlike
Conduct: Title IXand Cohen v. Brown University, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
305 (1997).
H See Aronberg, supra note 2, at 747.
2See infra notes 141-53 and accompanying text.
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if the court system enforces Title IX as originally intended and athletic
departments cut unnecessary spending within their departments.
This Note examines the attempts of both the court system and
universities to interpret, enforce, and comply with Title IX. Part I of the
Note outlines the evolution of Title IX since its inception and the federal
court decisions that have interpreted and enforced Title IX requirements.13
Part II examines how the courts' frequent interpretation of Title IX,
effectively as an affirmative action statute, is contrary to the actual intent
of the statute. 4 Part H details how some universities' spending habits
prevent compliance with Title IX.'1 Lastly, Part IV analyzes how a different
interpretation of Title IX and improved athletic spending habits could result
in increased participation for women without the loss of men's sports.'
6
I. THE EVOLUTION OF TITLE IX
A. The History of Title IX and the Requirements Imposed
A brief summary of the history of Title IX and its requirements is
necessary to recognize the current problems with Title IX enforcement.
Title IX first came into the spotlight in 1972 when the Education Amend-
ments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were passed. 7 Title IX of those
Education Amendments states in part: "No person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 8 This amendment basically
prohibits sex-based discrimination in any education program or activity
receiving federal financial assistance. 9 Because nearly all colleges and
universities benefit from federal funding, they must comply with the
requirements of Title IX.
The adoption of Title IX in 1972 had an immediate impact on women's
athletic participation in terms of growth. By 1998, the number of female
high school student-athletes had grown from 300,000 to more than two
"See infra notes 17-90 and accompanying text.
,4 See infra notes 91-130 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 131-53 and accompanying text.
6See infra notes 154-66 and accompanying text.
'7 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1995).
'81d. § 1681(a).
" But see infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
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million." Similarly, participation inwomen's college sports increased from
32,000 in 1972 to 150,000 in 1983.21 Additionally, the number ofuniversi-
ties that offered scholarships for women's sports jumped from sixty in 1974
to five hundred in 198 1.1 These increases in participation and opportunities
mostly came after the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
("HEW") formulated specific regulations in 1975 intended to enforce Title
IX on campuses around the nation.' These regulations were a response to
complaints that Title IX was too vague.24 Before these regulations were
imposed, universities were unable to ascertain whether Title IX applied to
intercollegiate athletics.'
The regulations imposed by HEW in 1975 specifically stated that Title
IX did apply to intercollegiate athletics. 26 The most notable section of
requirements demanded equal opportunity for both sexes.27 In deciding
whether universities were offering equal opportunity, HEW provided a
list of ten factors for consideration.2 At the top of this list is what is
known as the "interests and abilities" factor.29 This factor is currently the
most important area of inquiry and asks "[w]hether the selection of sports
and levels of competition effectively accommodate the interests and
abilities of members of both sexes."30 HEW gave schools a maximum of
three years to comply with Title IX or face being stripped of federal
funding.
31
Despite the regulations, HEW continued to receive numerous
complaints regarding how vague the requirements actually were. These
complaints probably were a result of the minimal legislative history
20See Trudy Saunders Bredthauer, Twenty Five Years Under Title lX Have We
Made Progress?, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1107, 1107 (1998).
21 See Robert Sullivan, A Law That Needs NewMuscle, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
Mar. 4, 1985, at 9.
22 See id.
23 See 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.37, 106.41 (1995).
24 See Susan M. Shook, Note, The Title IX Tug-of-War and Intercollegiate
Athletics in the 1990's: Nonrevenue Men's Teams Join Women Athletes in the
Scramble for Survival, 71 IND. L.J. 773, 775 (1996).
I See id.
26 See 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.37, 106.41.
21 See id. § 106.41(c).
I See id. § 106.41(c)(1)-(10).
29 Id. § 106.41(c)(1).
30 Id.
31 See id. § 106.41(d); 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1995).
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available regarding Title IX's application to athletics.32 In fact, sports were
mentioned only twice throughout the congressional debate on Title IX.
Because of the continued confusion among university officials, the
Department ofEducation's Office of Civil Rights ("OCR") issued a "Policy
Interpretation" of Title IX in 1979.11 The Policy Interpretation was
specifically aimed at intercollegiate athletics.3
Based on the Policy Interpretation, compliance with Title IX requires
that: (1) athletically related financial assistance be allocated in proportion
to the numbers of male and female students participating in intercollegiate
athletics; 36 (2) all other benefits, opportunities, and treatment afforded
participants of each sex be equivalent;37 and (3) the interests and abilities
of students be effectively accommodated to the extent necessary to provide
equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes.3" The major goal of
the Policy Interpretation was no different than that of the 1975 HEW
regulations; both sought to "effectively accommodate the interests and
abilities of... both sexes"39 by expanding the athletic opportunities
available to women.'
The Policy Interpretation of 1979 has become the cornerstone of a
substantial portion of Title IX litigation. Specifically, the third requirement
calling for effective accommodation of interests and abilities for both sexes
is seen as the major step towards Title IX compliance.4' In deciding
whether this requirement has been met, the Policy Interpretation set out yet
another three-part test.42 This internal test has been dubbed the "effective
32 See Aronberg, supra note 2, at 754.
33 See Courtney W. Howland, Note, Sex Discrimination and Intercollegiate
Athletics: Putting Some Muscle on Title IX, 88 YALE L.J. 1254, 1255 n.11 (1979).
34 The Department of Education assumed responsibility for educational matters
after HEW was split into two agencies by Congress. The OCR was assigned the
duty of Title IX administration and is currently the enforcement agency for Title
IX. See Shook, supra note 24, at n.12.
35 See Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979).
36 See id. at 71,415.
37 See id. at 71,415-17.
38 See id. at 71,417-18.
39 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1) (1995).
40 See id.; Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,415.
41 See Bemardo, supra note 10, at 317. The author describes the requirement
that universities effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of both sexes
as "the 'heartland' of equal opportunity."
42See Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418.
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accommodation test'"3 and requires a university to meet any one of the
following standards:
(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male
and female students are provided in numbers substantially proportionate
to their respective enrollments; or
(2) Where the members of one sex have been and are under-
represented among intercollegiate athletes, whether the institution can
show a history and continuing practice of program expansion which is
demonstrably responsive to the developing interest and abilities of the
members of that sex; or
(3) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented among
intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot show a continuing
practice of program expansion such as that cited above, whether it can be
demonstrated that the interests and abilities of the members of that sex
have been fully and effectively accommodated by the present program."
This effective accommodation test and its three prongs have been the
focal point for federal appellate courts in Title IX litigation.45 The first
prong of the test, requiring "substantial proportionality," provides
institutions with a so-called "safe harbor" for compliance because
opportunities for females are obviously accommodated if they are
proportionate to the percentage of females on campus." "Substantial
proportionality" has become the focus of Title IX controversy because it
mandates sex quotas based on the percentage of students from each sex at
the school in question.47 However, it is important to point out that
institutions need not meet the first prong of the effective accommodation
test if they can meet one of the other two prongs of the test.4s
Title IX opponents, though, are quick to point out that the last two
prongs of the effective accommodation test are both infeasible.49 These
"3 See generally Bemardo, supra note 10, at 317-18 (discussing the effective
accommodation test components).
"Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418.
4See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 897 (lst Cir. 1993) (stating
that both parties cited effective accommodation as the area that the appeal
contested).
46 See id. at 897-98.
47 See id. at 898.
48 See id.
49 See Aronberg, supra note 2, at 786.
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opponents of Title IX argue that the court system focuses on "substantial
proportionality."5 They feel that the third prong of the test basically
restates the first prong's mandate for sex quotas and the second prong is not
reachable for any school. This leaves the test, as a whole, a standard of
affirmative action.
5'
B. Developments in Title IXLitigation
Two United States Supreme Court cases opened the door to more
frequent Title IX litigation in the 1990s. First, in the 1979 case Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 2 the Supreme Court held that although there is no
express statutory provision empowering a private party to bring suit to
enforce Title IX, there is an implied private right of action in the statute to
bring such a suit.' Later, in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 4
the Supreme Court held that a private party could collect monetary
damages where the violations of Title IX are intentional.55 These two cases
allowed enforcement of Title IX through the court system (as opposed to
filing a complaint with the OCR) 6 and permitted awards of monetary relief
in addition to any injunctive relief.
57
Many violations of Title IX have undoubtedly been enforced through
out-of-court settlements. 58 This allows many schools to save face rather
than go through a lengthy, expensive, high-risk litigation process.
Meanwhile, those schools which have challenged Title IX complaints in
court have consistently lost.59
The sole victory for Title IX opponents came in 1984 in Grove City
College v. Bell.6" In that case, the Supreme Court held that Title IX was
"program-specific" and did not apply to programs that did not actually
receive federal funds.6' Thus, Title IX did not apply to most athletic
50See id.
s' See id.
52 Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
51 See id. at 677.
4 Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
55 See id. at 60.
56 See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 688-89.
57 See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 60.
58 See Joan O'Brien, The Unlevel Playing Field, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 4,
1994, at Al.
59See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (lst Cir. 1993).
60 Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
61See id. at 574.
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programs even though the university received federal funds.62 This ruling
was contrary to some Title IX supporters' view that the amendment applied
institution-wide and all programs at universities that received federal funds
were to be held accountable. 63
However, the victory Title IX opponents realized in Grove City College
v. Bell was short-lived. Congress disagreed with the Supreme Court's
limited interpretation of Title IX and passed the Civil Rights Restoration
Act of 1987.61 This act reversed the holding in Grove City College v. Bell
and stated that "the term 'program or activity' and 'program' mean all of
the operations of. . .a college, university, or other post-secondary
institution, or a public system of higher education... any part of which is
extended Federal financial assistance."'65 Thus, Title IX once again applied
to intercollegiate athletics. The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 led to
both court-imposed and voluntary actions by universities in their attempts
to comply with Title IX. This movement was especially difficult for those
institutions who had cut women's programs in the wake of Grove City
College v. Bell.
66
Three federal appellate court decisions have set the judicial standard
for Title IX compliance. The first and most prominent of these cases is
Cohen v. Brown University.' Amy Cohen brought suit in response to a
Brown University decision to eliminate the women's volleyball and
gymnastics teams.6 The appellate court, applying the effective accommo-
dation test set out in the OCR's Policy Interpretation of 1979, determined
that Brown University had failed to comply with Title IX.69 The primary
controversy with the Cohen decision is the court's application of the third
prong of the effective accommodation test. This portion of the test asks
whether the university fully accommodates the interests and abilities of
each sex.70 The court rej ected Brown University's argument that this prong
of the effective accommodation test is met where an institution provides
62See id.
63 See id.
I Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28
(codified as 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988)).
65 Id.
66 See Craig Neff, Equality at Last, Part II, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 21,
1988, at 70, 71.
67 Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (lst Cir. 1993).
61 See id. at 888.
69 See id. at 896-99.
7 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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athletic opportunities to women that reflect "the ratio of interested and able
women to interested and able men, regardless of the number of unserved
women orthe percentage of the student body that they comprise."71 Instead,
the third prong of the effective accommodation test was said to be a high
standard demanding universities to provide full and effective accommoda-
tion where interest and ability exist to "'sustain a viable team and a
reasonable expectation of intercollegiate competition forthat team.' 72 The
controversy surrounding the third prong of the effective accommodation
test is discussed in detail in Part II.
The second federal case, Favia v. Indiana University ofPennsylvania,7
was also important in regards to the application of the OCR's Policy
Interpretation. The federal court inFavia heldthat the institution's decision
to disband the women's field hockey and gymnastics teams violated the
requirements of Title IX.74 This case was especially important in that it
"was the first federal court decision to expressly apply any provision
of the Policy Interpretation to a Title IX claim in the college sports con-
text."7
5
The third federal case that helped mold the court system's interpreta-
tion of Title IX was Roberts v. Colorado State Board ofAgriculture.76 In
Roberts, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,
interpreting the effective accommodation test, found that Colorado State
University's elimination of the women's softball team violated Title IX.77
Once again, a court applied the three-prong test described in the OCR's
Policy Interpretation.' The Roberts decision also maintained that an
institution cannot show a history of expanding opportunities for women
(prong two of the effective accommodation test) by making cuts in both the
71 Cohen, 991 F.2d at 899 (emphasis omitted).
2 Id. at 898 (quoting Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979)).
3 Favia v. Indiana Univ. ofPa., 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa.), aft'd, 7 F.3d 332
(3d Cir. 1993).
74 See id. at 584.
1 Brian L. Porto, Completing the Revolution: Title 1K as Catalyst for an
Alternative Model of College Sports, 8 SETONHALLJ. SPORTS L. 351,369 (1998).
The author describes the need for a new model of collegiate athletics based on the
corruption that has resulted from the commercialism of college sports. See id. at
383-99.
76 Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993).
77 See id.
78 See id. at 828-29.
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men's and women's sports programs. 9 This particular ruling mirrored a
similar decision in Favia.0
Reverse discrimination suits brought by male athletes whose teams
were disbanded have been universally rejected by the courts.8 In Gonyo v.
Drake University, a United States District Court held that the elimination
of the men's wrestling program did not constitute sex discrimination in
violation of Title IX where the current athletic opportunities for men were
proportionately greater than those offered to women. 2
Similarly, in Kelley v. Board of Trustees, the Seventh Circuit held that
the University of Illinois did not violate Title IX.a3 In that case, the
university eliminated the men's swimming team while retaining the
women's swimming team.84 The court held that where men's participation
in athletics was more than substantially proportionate to their enroll-
ment, Title IX cannot be violated in regard to disbandment of a men's
team.85 Both of these reverse discrimination cases show the court's reliance
on the effective accommodation test adopted by the OCR's Policy
Interpretation.
One of the most recent federal decisions has actually given hope to
Title IX opponents who disagree with the current application of the
effective accommodation test. In Pederson v. Louisiana State University,6
a United States District Court rejected the conclusion of other courts that
substantial proportionality alone was a "safe harbor" for Title IX compli-
ance.87 The court in Pederson held Louisiana State University in violation
of Title IX, but stated that
it seems much more logical that interest in participation and levels of
ability to participate as percentages of the male and female populations
will vary from campus to campus and region to region and will change
with time. To assume, and thereby mandate, an unsupported and static
79 See id. at 839.
'0 See Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 585 (W.D. Pa.), afid,
7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993).
8 See, e.g., Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994); Gonyo v.
Drake Univ., 837 F. Supp. 989 (S.D. Iowa 1993).82See Gonyo, 837 F. Supp. at 989.
83See Kelley, 35 F.3d at 265.
84 See id.
8 See id. at 271.86 Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996).
87See id.
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determination of interest and ability as the cornerstone of the analysis can
lead to unjust results. 8
For many Title IX opponents, this statement provided promise that
interpretation of the effective accommodation test will move away from
sole analysis of"substantial proportionality" and sex quotas.89 Instead, Title
IX analysis should include a determination of whether an institution
accommodates an equal percentage of interested athletes who have the
ability to participate.' Discussion of this case and its relevance continues
in Part II of this Note.
II. THE COURTS' INTERPRETATION OF TITLE IX
The attempts by universities across the nation to meet Title IX come
in direct response to the judicial reading of the Policy Interpretation
released by the OCR. For those schools who have attempted to meet Title
IX, the most common reaction to litigation has been the elimination of
men's sports.9 ' Title IX either has not yet been taken seriously by
institutions or has been seen as infeasible for most of the schools that have
88 Id. at 913-14 (rejecting reliance on the substantial proportionality prong of
the effective accommodation test).
89 See, e.g., Aronberg, supra note 2, at 801 (describing how the decision in
Pederson was a "stinging rebuke of the proportionality test" that "capitalized on,
and added to, the anti-quota momentum building in the courts and Congress").
9 See Maureen E. Mahoney, The Numbers Don 'tAdd Up So Says a Lawiyerfor
Brown, Which Is Fighting to Ensure Title IX Benefits for All Students, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, May 5, 1997, at 78, 78 [hereinafter Maureen E. Mahoney, The
Numbers Don't Add Up]. The writer, an attorney for Brown University, fully
explains the university's disagreement with the court's emphasis on substantial
proportionality.
9, Since 1982, 99 men's wrestling teams have been dropped, while 64 schools
have discontinued men's swimming. See Jessica Gavora, College Women Get More
Than TheirSporting Chance, INSIGHTMAG., Jan. 22, 1996, at 25, available in 1996
WL 8310175. "[A]cross the nation, male college athletes are receiving letters and
phone calls informing them that their varsity careers are over." Craig L. Hymowitz,
Losers on the Level Playing Field: How Men's Sports Got Sacked by Quotas,
Bureaucrats and Title IX, WASH. POST, Sept 24, 1995, at C5. More than one-half
of all collegiate wrestling teams have been eliminated since the enactment of Title
IX. "[Miost were dropped to comply with gender-equity guidelines." L. Jon
Wertheim, Can't Keep 'Em Down, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 30, 1998, at 24.
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not disbanded men's teams. This is clearly based on the low proportion of
female athletes at most institutions.
92
A. Interpretation of Title IXin Cohen v. Brown University
The basic interpretation of Title IX was rendered in Cohen v. Brown
University.93 As previously discussed, the first prong of the effective
accommodation test requires that "participation opportunities for male and
female students are provided in numbers substantially proportionate to their
respective enrollments." 94 This part of the test clearly requires quotas for
each sex, but is only a "safe harbor" for institutions.95 If opportunities are
proportionate, then there is obviously no discrimination of opportunity and
"extensive compliance analysis" is not necessary.96 However, "substantive
proportionality" need not be attained by an institution if either prong two
or three of the effective accommodation is met.97
Prong two of the effective accommodation test allows those universi-
ties that are "continually expanding athletic opportunities in an ongoing
effort to meet the needs of the underrepresented gender" to meet Title IX
even though proportionality is not attained.98 This prong of the test cannot
be met, however, by dropping men's teams.99 This requirement makes
prong two of the test futile for institutions that are looking to lower athletic
expenditures.
Prongthree of the effective accommodation testrequires an assessment
as to whether there has been need or expressed interest to form a new team
by the underrepresented sex.1" At first glance, this looks to be the most
92 Women account for 52% of enrollment at Division I colleges but make up
only 37% of the athletes. See Karen Dillon, NCAA Certification Program Does
Little to Improve Gender Equity (visited Apr. 7, 1999) <http://www.kcstar.com/
ncaa/part5.html>.
93 Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 897 (1st Cir. 1993) ("[A]n institution
that offers women a smaller number of athletic opportunities than the statute
requires may not rectify that violation simply by lavishing more resources on those
women or achieving equivalence in other respects.").
4 Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (1979).
95See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 897.
96 See id. at 897-98.
97 See id. at 898.
98 Id.
1 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
" See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898.
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attractive prong of the test for an institution attempting to meet Title IX
requirements. Considering the popular belief by many that females are less
interested in sports than males, a university likely would not have to
develop a new team unless sufficient interest existed.'0' However, the court
in Cohen acknowledged that the "third benchmark of the accommodation
test.., sets a high standard."'1 2 The standard is high because this prong of
the test does not allow compliance based on satisfying equal proportions
of interested and able athletes from each sex, as argued by Brown. 10 3 The
Cohen court made this clear when it stated that:
Brown reads the "full" out of the duty to accommodate "fully and
effectively." It argues instead that an institution satisfactorily accommo-
dates female athletes if it allocates athletic opportunities to women in
accordance with the ratio of interested and able women to interested and
able men, regardless of the number of unserved women or the percentage
of the student body that they comprise."°
Meeting prong three of the test is impossible for schools that do not
meet substantial proportionality, considering the Cohen court refused to
distinguish between prongs one and three of the effective accommodation
test. ' The interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex cannot be
"fully and effectively accommodated" because of the existence of a lawsuit
filed in response to cutting a women's sport."° Additionally, the example
presented by the court in Cohen makes it clear that an equal number of
opportunities for both sexes must be available for a school to meet the third
prong of the test. 7 This interpretation ofthe "full and effective accommo-
dation" requirement makes it identical to the "substantial proportionality"
' See Maureen E. Mahoney, TheNumbers Don'tAdd Up, supra note 90, at 78
(pointing out that men outnumber women eight to one in Brown's intramural
program and approximately 60% of students who want to play varsity sports are
men).
'02 Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898.
103 See id. at 899.
"o Id. (emphasis omitted).
'" See Aronberg, supra note 2, at 786-88 (analyzing how the third prong of the
effective accommodation test is "nearly invisible").
"o Id. at 787 (citing Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979)).
'07 See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 899. The example the court analyzed involved the
hypothetical "Oooh U." where 500 men and 250 women are able and interested
athletes. See id.
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requirement. Thus, the Cohen court has effectively read prong three out of
the effective accommodation test. Considering that prong two of the test is
not likely to be met, as the Cohen court readily admitted, this interpretation
of the effective accommodation test makes Title IX a de facto affirmative
action statute."0 8 The court in Cohen virtually admitted as much by
supporting its argument with the statement: "It is clear that Congress has
broad powers under the Fifth Amendment to remedy past discrimina-
tion.
109
B. The Cohen Interpretation Has Failed
The court in Cohen v. Brown University rationalized its call to
accommodate women at a higher rate by arguing that schools cannot
accurately survey the interests of women on campus because of the
continuing increase in the interest women have in intercollegiate
athletics.10 Additionally, the court argued that the interpretation sought by
Brown University would make the test complicated and difficult to
enforce."
I
Based on many of the statistics regarding Title IX, it would seem that
women need all of the Title IX protection courts can give them."' It is
estimated that "women account for more than half of the undergraduate
student body but only about a quarter of athletic operating expenses and
recruiting dollars."'" 3 However, judicial interpretation of Title IX has not
resulted in increased opportunities for women but merely a continued
elimination of men's sports. This elimination allows schools to meet the
"substantial proportionality" prong ofthe effective accommodation test."'
Schools see this prong of the test as their only chance to comply with Title
IX. The latest instance came at Providence College in October 1998."1 In
order to comply with Title IX, Providence decided to drop its men's
108 See id. at 898.
109Id. at 901.
"I See id. at 900; see also Roy Whitehead, Jr. et al., Gender Equity in College
Athletics After Brown and Louisiana State: Why the Big Boys Are Crying, ARK.
LAW., Winter 1997, at 10, 15.
i' See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 900 (1st Cir. 1993).
2See Rhode, supra note 4, at A19.
113Id.
See Shook, supra note 24, at 793-95.
"5 See Paul Tolme, Providence College Eliminating Men's Baseball, Golf,
Tennis, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 8, 1998, at E2, available in 1998 WL 9157439.
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baseball, golf, and tennis teams." 6 The action taken by Providence College
followed similar occurrences at the University of Cincinnati,' 1 7 the
University of Louisville,"8 New Mexico State University,"9 and hundreds
of other schools across the nation.12 As previously mentioned, elimination
of men's teams allows universities to become "substantially proportionate"
but does not result in increased opportunities for women.'
In addition to not improving the number of opportunities for women,
the current judicial interpretation of Title IX is contrary to the intent of
Title IX's framers." In fact, Title IX contains a subsection that reads:
(b) Preferential or disparate treatment because of imbalance in participa-
tion or receipt of Federal benefits; statistical evidence of imbalance.
Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section shall be interpreted to
require any educational institution to grant preferential or disparate
treatment to the members of one sex on account of an imbalance which
may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of that
sex participating in or receiving the benefits of any federally supported
program or activity, in comparison with the total number orpercentage of
persons of that sex in any community .... 123
This provision of Title IX clarifies that the original intent of the amend-
ment was not affirmative action or sex quotas. Additionally, comments
made by Senator Birch Bayh, who originally sponsored the amendment in
1971, make it obvious that Title IX contains no ambiguity in regard to the
issue of quotas.' 24 Senator Bayh stated that "[t]he amendment is not
116 See id.
117 The University of Cincinnati decided to disband its men's tennis, indoor
track, and coed rifle teams in May 1998. See id.
11 The University of Louisville announced that it would drop men's indoor
track. See id.
"I New Mexico State University announced that it would disband its men's
track and swimming teams. See id.
120 See supra note 91 and accompanying text
12 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
"See, e.g., Donald C. Mahoney, Note and Comment, Taking a Shot at the
Title: A Critical Review ofJudicial and Administrative Interpretations of Title 1X
asApplied to IntercollegiateAthleticPrograms, 27 CONN. L. REV. 943,954 (1995)
[hereinafter Donald C. Mahoney, Taking a Shot at the Title].
2 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (1995).
24 See Donald C. Mahoney, Taking a Shot at the Title, supra note 122, at 945-
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designed to require specific quotas... What we are saying is that we are
striking down quotas. The thrust of the amendment is to do away with
every quota."'" Clearly, Title IX was not intended to be applied as it is
today.
C. Moving Away from "Substantial Proportionality"
The decision in Pederson v. Louisiana State University126 shows that
at least one court has rejected the Cohen reliance on substantial proportion-
ality. In Pederson, the court dismissed previous decisions that relied upon
proportionality and stated that "[c]easing the [Title IX] inquiry at the point
of numerical proportionality does not comport with the mandate of the
statute."'127 The Cohen court's analysis of Title IX compliance does not
consider that the interest level of male and female students on a single
campus may not be equal. 2 By requiring statistical equality of opportu-
nity, courts are dismissing the chance an institution has to offer those
opportunities to interested students. Allowing Title IX compliance through
analysis of campus interests would translate into more opportunities for a
sex if the interested and able athletes of that sex are not equally accommo-
dated. As women's interests in sports continue to increase, this could mean
more opportunities for women than men on some campuses or vice versa
if female interest in sports is low on a certain campus. The current Title IX
analysis, however, is an easy way out for the court system and does not
consider the clear intent of the original amendment.
Officials at all universities have the resources to determine the athletic
interests and abilities of their student bodies. This determination can be
accomplished through questionnaires and interviews of students, coaches,
and administrators; analysis of current participation in intramural, club, or
interscholastic sports; and through requests by students to add a particular
sport. By determining the interests and abilities on their own campuses,
schools can then shape their athletic programs based on their particular
needs. The court in Pederson said it best: "[T]his Court will not join in
assuming that athletic directors in this country are incapable of meeting the
burden of Title IX and its regulations which incorporates a knowledge
regarding their student body, effective analysis of and meeting students'
12s Id. (quoting 117 CONG. REC. 30,409 (1971) (emphasis omitted)).
26 Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996).
271d. at 914.
" See id. at 913; see, e.g., Whitehead, Jr. et al., supra note 110, at 40.
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needs, and filling those needs in a non-discriminatory fashion."'29 The
current interpretation of Title IX does not provide equal opportunity; it
provides preferential treatment for one sex in situations where an institution
may already effectively meet the interests and abilities of both sexes.
"Women don't have to have 50% of the varsity positions to succeed as
athletes. They need equal opportunity, and you don't get that from a
numerical formula."'3 °
II. ATHLETIC DEPARTMENT SPENDING HABITS
Judicial interpretation of Title IX is not the sole cause of the continued
elimination of men's sports by universities or their failure to comply with
the requirements of Title IX. Even if courts interpreted Title IX according
to the original intent of the legislature, a mismanagement of funds by many
athletic departments would prevent improvement in these two problematic
areas. By continually overspending on certain sports, institutions have
made maintaining the current number of teams and meeting Title IX
requirements virtually impossible.'3 '
The revenue earned at Division I institutions around the nation is,
without a doubt, substantial. "In the last twenty-three years, the NCAA's
total revenues have increased by over 8,000 percent. ' '' 32 The latest tally
showed the NCAA giving back $165.6 million to member schools. 33 Much
of the current rise in revenues is due to the record-high television contract
that the NCAA negotiated for men's basketball games. Currently, CBS is
under contract to broadcast men's basketball games through the year 2002
for an astounding $1.725 billion.13 This contract is larger than any other
single professional sports league deal with any network. 35 Television
contracts certainly are not the only reason for a rise in NCAA revenue.
"This decade alone corporate sponsorships are on a pace to increase
' 29Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 914 (emphasis omitted).
130 Maureen E. Mahoney, The Numbers Don't Add Up, supra note 90, at 78.
'3' See Mike McGraw et al., Money Games Inside the NCAA: Revenues Domi-
nate College Sports World, KAN. CITY STAR, Oct. 5, 1997, at Al; see also Porto,
supra note 75, at 385-88 (describing how colleges return most proceeds to the
sports that produce the revenue).
13 McGraw et al., supra note 131, at Al.
3 See Mike McGraw, NCAA Permeated with Perks, KAN. CITY STAR, Oct. 6,
1997, at A1.
'3 See id.
'35 See McGraw et al., supra note 131, at Al.
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sevenfold .... "136 Thanks in part to corporate sponsors, college sports
generate almost $2 billion in annual revenue for Division I institutions.
137
This number has been estimated to be twice the amount given by the
Department of Defense to colleges for research. 138 Additionally, ticket sales
and licensing are major sources of income for many schools. At the
University of Nebraska, the athletic program earned $11.3 million from
football ticket sales and $2 million from licensing in 1997.139 These
numbers are only one indicator of how collegiate sports have turned into
big business. The most important statistic may be that the average Division
I-A college makes more than $4 million annually on men's basketball and
football. 140
"Despite rising revenues, most athletic programs in Division I and
Division I[ continue to lose money .... ,141 Only twenty athletic programs
in Division I currently make a profit, and this is up from eleven in 1995.42
The obvious reason is that revenues are not rising as quickly as expenses. 1
43
The University of Michigan leads the way in total athletic expenses at
$36,302,000.'" The University of Florida, Ohio State University, the
University of Tennessee, and the University of Nebraska are not far
behind.145 In total, athletic costs have soared ninety percent in the last five
years.'1 Even the huge revenue increase is not enough to offset such lavish
spending. In 1995-96, Division I schools had athletic deficits totaling $245
million. 47
Analysis of expenditures at many schools reveals that athletic
departments simply are spending too much on unneeded expenses. At the
University of Nebraska, the athletic department "paid $1.7 million to send
730 coaches, athletic administrators, the board of regents, spouses,






141 Steve Brisendine, PlayingDoesn 'tAlways Pay at Most Schools, Study Says,
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), Oct. 13, 1998, at D7.
142 see id.
143 See id.
' See TotalAthleticExpenses (visitedApr. 7,1999) <http://www2.Kansascity.
com/cgi-bin/php.cgi/php/ncaa/page.php?name=athlexpense>.
145 See id.
146 See McGraw et al., supra note 131, at Al.
147 See id.
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Florida [for a men's football bowl game]. More than 300 Huskers stayed
for at least ten days. ' 14 Travel expenses are similar for the University of
Kansas football team. The athletic department there spent $47,000 in
1996 to put the team up in a hotel for home football games. 149 Similarly,
the University of Clemson athletic department spent $1.6 million from
1990 to 1995 to buy out the contracts of two former head football
coaches. 5 0
The examples presented here characterize the mismanagement of funds
found in athletic departments across the country. The incredible revenue
earned is spent on hotel accommodations, locker rooms, indoor training
facilities for one sport, video equipment, and meeting facilities.15 These
expenditures often serve only the sport that produces revenue. 52 In fact,
one study showed that for every dollar in revenue earned by sports like
football and basketball, only five cents is spent on nonrevenue sports.
53
This proves that nonrevenue sports are not supported by those that make
money. Instead, revenue is spent excessively on the same sport that earns
the revenue. This practice prevents institutions from funding new women's
teams and maintaining the nonrevenue men's teams that already exist.
Instead, athletic officials have decided that they cannot be outspent in the
on-going pursuit and preservation of recruits, current players, and coaches.
As other schools spend more, a recruiting competition is created where
there is no winner, only a spending farce that never ends. This spending is
aimed at pleasing alumni and maintaining or developing a winner on the
playing field at literally all costs. These spending habits prevent institutions
from providing new opportunities for both sexes while also maintaining
their current teams.
IV. MAKING TITLE IX AN EFFICIENT AMENDMENT
The current judicial interpretation of Title IX and the common
university reaction to this interpretation make it clear that Title IX is not
148 Id.
149 See id.
"' See Jack McCalum et al., Pinned Program, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 27,
1995, at 15.
' See Porto, supra note 75, at 388 (describing college sports as "a lottery that
many colleges play but that only a few can win").
152 See id.
" See id. at 387 (citing Arthur Padilla & David Baumer, Big-Time College
Sports: Management and Economic Issues, 18 J. SPORT & SOC. IsSUES 128, 139
(1994)).
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being enforced effectively today. In effect, courts have interpreted Title IX
as an affirmative action amendment, and many colleges have decided to
meet Title IX requirements by disbanding men's teams. 5 4 This was not the
result that Title IX's framers intended.' In order to convert Title IX into
an efficient amendment, our court system must cease its affirmative action
interpretation of Title IX. In addition, our nation's universities must learn
to manage athletic revenues more efficiently and shift more funds to
nonrevenue teams. These changes could very well result in higher
participation rates among female athletes, and yet not come at the expense
of male athletes.
The interpretation of Title DC that is favorable to all parties was
described best by the attorneys for Brown University in Cohen v. Brown
University.i"6 This interpretation stands for the belief that "equal opportu-
nity can be afforded [by colleges and universities] through a broad array of
teams that reflect the relative interests and abilities of both sexes."'57 It is
important to emphasize that this interpretation of Title DC will aid
nonrevenue men's teams that would otherwise be dropped because of the
"substantial proportionality" requirement.
This alternate interpretation of Title IX will not be effective unless
universities make a commitment to spending money on nonrevenue teams.
The most effective method for shifting revenue towards nonrevenue sports
is enforcing a spending cap on revenue sports, which will be a very tough
task for supporters of nonrevenue teams. A spending cap plan could be
initiated by either the NCAA or an individual institution. Undoubtedly, the
revenue earned by most schools will continue to increase as the nation's
infatuation with collegiate sports grows. By capping the amount of
expenses allowed for an individual sport, an institution will be forced to
spend carefully and shift funds to nonrevenue sports. This result will force
colleges to recognize the inefficiency in disbanding men's teams and
providing facilities that can be utilized by only one sport. As women
continue to show more interest in sports (and the myth regarding women's
lack of interest in sports is dispelled), funds must be spent on providing
more opportunities for women.'58 Otherwise, Title IX cannot be satisfied
under any interpretation.
154 See supra notes 9-11, 112-21 and accompanying text.
'55 See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
16 Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (Ist Cir. 1993).
'7Maureen E. Mahoney, TheNumbersDon 'tAdd Up, supra note 90, at78. For
further discussion, see supra Part II.
"' One commentator has noted that before Title IX was enacted "fewer than one
in 20 high school girls participated in sports .... Now the ratio is one in three."
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One university has already initiated plans enabling it to comply with
the requirements of Title IX. At the University of Kansas, school officials
decided four years ago to begin efforts to comply with Title IX. 59 In 1996,
"women ma[d]e up 49 percent of all students and 47 percent of [the]
athletes" at the University. 160 The answer to the Title IX dilemma at Kansas
was increased spending on nonrevenue sports.161 Instead of shifting money
away from revenue sports, the university found donors willing to aid
women's sports. 62 Athletic directorBob Frederick statedthat the university
was not going to sacrifice its existing athletic programs but was "going to
find a way to come up with the extra revenue to meet the challenge."'163 He
added that many people were interested in helping women's sports, but a
lot of people had not been askedjM Kansas used the donated funds to build
both an $8 million athletic sports complex (withmale and female facilities)
and a women's soccer field and to renovate the women's basketball locker
room. 65 Other schools have made similar leaps toward achieving sex
equity, but these gains have come at the expense of male athletes."
CONCLUSION
Over the last three decades, Title IX has enabled more women to
participate in collegiate athletics than ever before. Recently, as budgets
have tightened, colleges have chosen to meet the requirements of Title IX
by cutting nonrevenue men's sports and leaving the number ofwomen who
participate at the status quo. This result does not the satisfy the intentions
of Title IX's framers. The original intent of Title IX was to increase female
Rhode, supra note 4, atA19. Another source reports that "58 percent ofAmericans
believe female college students have as much as or more interest in sports than
male students. Another study says nine out of 10 girls expect to play sports as
adults." Karen Dillon, Women Coaches Finish Second, KAN. CITY STAR, Oct. 9,
1997, at A21, available in 1997 WL 3026912.
'59 See Karen Dillon, Schools Make Strides with Eye TowardEquity, KAN. CITY







' See id. This author describes the attempts made by Washington State
University and Michigan State University to comply with Title DC by disbanding
nonrevenue men's teams.
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participation in sports, among other activities, based on the interests and
abilities that exist on an individual campus. Unfortunately, our court
system has chosen to enforce Title IX as an affirmative action amendment.
Collegiate institutions have compoundedthisjudicial problem by spending
funds recklessly. This careless spending comes at a time when sports
revenues are at an all-time high. By interpreting Title IX as originally
intended and spending money more efficiently, Title IX can require
colleges to satisfy the interests and abilities of their students.
